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Abstract 
 
A popular functional form for modeling the consumption block of a computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE) is the Linear Expenditure System (LES) for which the Engel 
curves are straight lines. To allow for more general shapes two other systems have been 
proposed in recent literature: An Implicitly Directly Additive Demand System (AIDADS, a 
generalization of LES) and the Specialized Constant Differences of Elasticities (CDE) 
system. To calibrate the parameters outside information on all income elasticities and all 
own price elasticities is needed, whereas LES only requires information on income 
elasticities and the Frisch parameter. In this paper we consider a special case of CDE, 
the Indirect Addilog System (IAS) that allows for non-straight Engel curves, whereas its 
outside data requirement is the same as for LES. The only disadvantage is that all cross 
price elasticities of a particular price are the same. In many developing countries there is 
hardly any information on price responses so that the AIDADS and CDE cannot be used. 
We propose the use of IAS rather than LES. In the empirical part we use IAS in a CGE 
model for Palestine and show that predictions of macro-economic indicators are 
remarkably close to those of IMF. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In production and consumer theory the mostly used production function and utility 
function is presumably the one due to Cobb and Douglas (1928). A major shortcoming of 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function is that preferences are homothetic implying unitary 
income elasticities so that Engel curves are straight lines through the origin. Moreover, 
the budget shares are constant. 
 
Tinbergen (1942) proposed to generalize the Cobb-Douglas production function by 
introducing positive minimum amounts of capital and labor. Shortly after the war this idea 
was introduced in the theory of consumption in a series of articles: Klein and Rubin 
(1948-1949), Samuelson (1948), Geary (1949-1950) and Stone (1954). This function is 
known as the Stone-Geary utility function and the ensuing demand model as the Linear 
Expenditure System (LES).  
 
In case of the LES function the marginal budget shares are constant; the income 
elasticities are not unitary, but the Engel curves are still straight lines, though not through 
the origin. 
 
In the early fifties of the last century this shortcoming of the LES function was recognized 
at Statistics Netherlands by Somermeyer and Wit who wanted to compare the income 
elasticities in the Netherlands in the pre-war period based on the last pre-war budget 
survey (1935/1936) with those of the post-war period for which the first budget survey 
was conducted in 1951 (Wit, 1957). In this period of shortage of data, one had to rely 
upon simplifying assumptions in order to be able to estimate the values of these 
elasticities. Somermeyer and Wit (1956) introduced a budget allocation model that has 
the same data requirements as the LES function, but that does not have the limitation of 
constancy of marginal budget shares. It was discovered later that this model had already 
been introduced by Leser (1941); a fact of which Somermeyer and Wit were unaware of. 
 
They published their results in Dutch so that this model was not known in the outside 
world and Houthakker (1960), who was unaware of the Somermeyer-Wit (1956) 
contribution, derived this model departing from an implicitly indirectly additive utility 
function. It is due to Houthakker that this model is named “indirect addilog system”. After 
Houthakker’s discovery Wit (1960) published the English translation of the 1956 and 
1957 articles.   
 
As time went on, more and more data became available and the indirect addilog system 
was abandoned in favor of more general models, like the almost ideal demand system, 
introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). A drawback of this model is that the fitted 
budget shares do not necessarily lie in the unit interval (see point v below) and that 
negativity (see point vi below) cannot be imposed.  
 
In the world of CGE-modeling, where there is usually is shortage of data, the most used 
model for consumer behavior is the LES model; see for instance Blonigen c.s. (1997) for 
an excellent treatment. It is shown therein that, if one disposes of a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) and if one disposes of outside information on the income elasticities and 
on the value of the Frisch parameter, a value is assigned to each of the parameters of 
the LES functional form (in the terminology of CGE modeling: the parameters are 
calibrated). 
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In 1975 Hanoch published an article in which Houthakker’s implicit additivity was 
generalized to what Hertel c.s. (1991) named “specialized CDE functional forms”. The 
use of this functional form in CGE modeling requires the specification of all income- and 
own price elasticities as outside information (2n, where n stands for the number of 
commodities) for the calibration of the parameters, which is (much) more demanding 
than for the LES for which the income elasticities and the Frisch parameter (or one own 
price elasticity) are required (n+1). 
 
In a series of articles, the so-called AIDADS (An Implicitly Directly Additive Demand 
System), due to Rimmer and Powell (1996), is advocated (Cranfield c.s., 2000, 2003, 
Reimer and Hertel, 2004). This model is a generalization of the LES that allows for non-
linear Engel curves. Like the specialized CDE functional form the drawback is that it 
requires more outside information than LES.  
 
Reimer and Hertel (2004) give a list of five theoretical properties which are met by the 
AIDADS model: 
 
i. The utility function must be non-homothetic 
 
ii. The demand should be well-behaved across the tremendous variation in incomes 
 
iii. The fitted budget shares should be in the [0,1] (= unit) interval  
 
iv. The demand system should have a parsimonious parameterization 
 
v. The demand system should incorporate the economic restrictions of adding-up, 
homogeneity and symmetry. 
             
            In addition to v the demand system should ideally incorporate the restriction of 
negativity, i.e. the utility function must be strictly quasi-concave so that optimization 
subject to the budget constraint yields a maximum (equivalently, the indirect utility 
function must be strictly quasi-convex or the Slutsky matrix must be negative semi-
definite of rank n-1). Consequently, we add to this list: 
 
vi. The demand system should incorporate the economic restriction of negativity. 
 
In many developing countries, Palestine being a prominent example, data scarcity is 
such that the implementation of the AIDADS or the Specialized CDE functional form (not 
to mention the almost ideal demand system) is not feasible so that one has to resort to a 
simplification. In case of the AIDADS the simplification would lead to the LES, with the 
disadvantage of linearity of the Engel curves, whereas in case of the specialized CDE 
the simplification is the indirect addilog system. 
 
 In this paper we introduce into CGE modeling the use of the indirect addilog system, 
which exhibits non-linear Engel curves and which satisfies the five requirements of 
Reimer and Hertel mentioned above, as well as the theoretical restriction of negativity 
(point vi above).  
 
It is shown that it has exactly the same data requirements as the LES, while its 
theoretical properties are more attractive than those of the LES. The theoretical 
conclusion of this paper is that, if one wishes to construct a CGE model for a country 
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that is faced with scarcity of data, the indirect addilog model should be preferred over the 
LES. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we give the specialized CDE 
model that has been used by Hertel c.s. (1991) and show that the indirect addilog 
system is a special case. Consequently, requirement iv (parsimony) is met with. Section 
3 is devoted to a discussion of the addilog system and it is given under which parameter 
restrictions this demand system satisfies the theoretical requirements iii, v and vi 
mentioned above. The indirect utility function and mathematical derivations are given in 
appendix A. In section 4 we pay attention to the income elasticities and the shapes of 
the Engel curves implied by the indirect addilog system. It follows from this section that 
three types of non-linear Engel curves are allowed for and that the demand is well-
behaved across a tremendous variation in incomes so that the system also meets the 
requirements i and ii mentioned above. In section 5 we deal with the price and 
substitution elasticities. We show that that all cross elasticities of a particular price are 
the same and that the differences of the elasticities of substitution are constant (CDE). 
Section 6 is devoted to the calibration of the parameters and we show that we need 
exactly the same outside information that is used to calibrate the LES parameters, 
namely, the income elasticities and the Frisch parameter. 
  
 Section 7 contains our empirical application: we apply the indirect addilog model in the 
framework of the CGE model for Palestine that has been used by Missaglia and de Boer 
(2004) in their contribution to the “Food-for-Work versus Cash-for-Work” debate: should 
workers participating in an employment program be paid in food and other essentials or 
in cash? It is shown that the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2002 simulated on the 
basis of the so-called intifada-shock applied to the 1998 benchmark SAM leads to macro 
figures that are remarkably close to those predicted by the IMF which followed an 
entirely different approach.  
 
Since in the CGE model used we take account of the demand of leisure in order to 
model the labor market, we devote the appendix B to a treatment of the extended 
indirect addilog system that introduces leisure into the indirect utility function. Moreover 
we show how to calculate the equivalent and compensating variation. 
 
The empirical conclusion of this paper is that the use of the indirect addilog system in a 
CGE model leads to meaningful results. 
 
2. The specialized CDE functional form applied to consumer demand 
 
Hertel c.s. (1991) summarizes the results of Hanoch (1975) of the specialized CDE 
functional form applied to technology in their Figure 1. In this approach returns to scale 
play a role so that the indirect addilog model is presented as a special case of the 
Explicit Indirect CDE (called “Explicit additivity” by Hertel c.s., 1991). However, in the 
framework of consumer demand the restriction on the parameterg , to be defined below, 
( 1g -= ) plays no role since preferences are ordinal. It is easily seen below that, from 
the mathematical point of view, the demand functions following from the explicit Indirect 
CDE do not depend on g . Since according to Hertel c.s. the explicit indirect CDE exhibits 
a parsimonious parameterization, the indirect addilog model is parsimonious as well 
(point iv of the list above, which will be abbreviated to “the list” in the sequel). 
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Let ix  denote the quantity that a consumer demands from commodity i (=1,…,n) and ip  
the corresponding price. We assume that a consumer desires to attain at least a utility 
level of u and that he minimizes the cost. Let m denote the minimum cost of attaining 
utility level u and let the normalized prices be m/pz ii = . 
 
Following Hertel c.s. (1991) we write the specialized CDE functional form as follows: 
 
1zuB)u,z(G iii bi
n
1i
be
i º= å
=
                                                                                               (1) 
 
Using Roy’s identity it follows from (1) that the demand for commodity i is: 
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x                                                                                                      (2) 
 
(Hertel c.s.,1991, equation (4)). 
 
In order to apply (2) in a CGE model we first have to calibrate the parameters ie and ib . 
Thereto we need to know all the income elasticities and all the own price elasticities. 
Then, the parameters iB are easily calibrated using data from a SAM.  
 
A special case of the specialized CDE functional form is the Explicit Indirect CDE which 
follows from the restriction that: 
 
gbe ii =                                                                                                                            (3) 
 
In this case the demand for commodity i boils down to: 
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Using the reparametrization iii bBc =  and ii b=a  we arrive at: 
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This functional form was introduced by Leser (1941), by Somermeyer and Wit (1956), 
and by Houthakker (1960) to whom this system owes its name of indirect addilog.   
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Defining the budget share 1ii xzw =  (4) can, alternatively, be written as: 
å
=
=
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w                                                                                                                 (5) 
 
If we impose the restriction: 
 
s-=a 1i                                                                                                                            
 
wheres  denotes the elasticity of substitution, we obtain the demand relations following 
from the CES utility function, of which the Cobb-Douglas utility function ( )1s =   and 
Leontief ( )0s = are special cases (see de Boer, 1997, who dealt with the indirect addilog 
counterpart in the theory of production, i.e. with Hanoch’s HCDES production function).  
 
3. The indirect addilog model of consumer demand 
 
In section 2 we have supplied the demand equations of the specialized CDE functional 
form and have shown that a special case gives rise to the following equations for the 
budget shares: 
 
å
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)m/p(cw                                                                                                       (6) 
 
where we replaced in (5) the normalized prices, i.e. iz , by m/pi . 
 
In appendix A (c.f. (A7)) we show that the restrictions on the parameters are: 
 
0ci >  and  1i £a                                                                                                            (7) 
 
where the equality sign may apply for at most one value of i. 
 
For the interpretation of the parameters we quote from Somermeyer and Langhout 
(1972): “The kc - with indeterminate level – may be interpreted as “preference 
coefficients” and the ka  as “reaction parameters”; the higher the value of ka  (i.e. the 
closer it is to 1), the more “urgent” the consumption of k may be considered to be, at 
least at lower income levels”. 
 
The preference coefficients ic are indeterminate, that is to say: if we multiply each of 
them by the same factor, the equations (6) do not change. Therefore we impose the 
identifying res triction that the preference coefficients sum up to one: 
 
å
=
=
n
1i
i 1c                                                                                                                           (8) 
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Since (6) adds up to 1, it is easily seen that the indirect addilog system satisfies the 
theoretical restriction of adding-up, whereas multiplication of all prices and expenditure 
by the same factor leaves the normalized prices unaffected. Consequently, the system 
satisfies the theoretical restriction of homogeneity as well (see point v of the list). 
 
It is clear that (7) implies that all shares are positive and, since they add up to one, that 
they are smaller than 1. Consequently, the fitted budget shares are in the [0, 1] (= unit) 
interval (point iii of the list). 
 
In the appendix A (c.f. (A12)) it is proved that the off-diagonal elements of the Slutsky 
matrix are: 
 
jiji
1
jij
i
j
i
ij s)1(mxxxm
x
p
x
s =a+a-a-=
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
= -  
 
where 
 
å
=
a=a
n
1j
jjw                                                                                                                     (9)                                                 
 
Consequently, the Slutsky matrix is symmetric , as it should be (see point v of the list). 
 
It should be noted that, in view of (7), the off-diagonal elements of the Slutsky matrix 
may be negative, zero or positive so that the indirect addilog system allows for 
complementarities, indifference and substitutability between commodities. 
 
Van Driel (1974) has shown that the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite with rank  
(n-1) if and only if (7) holds true. Consequently, the addilog system satisfies requirement 
vi (negativity). 
 
4. Income elasticities and the shapes of Engel curves  
 
Income elasticities 
 
In this section we summarize the findings of Somermeyer and Langhout (1972). 
 
For ease of exposition we order the commodities such that: 
 
jj1
min a=a     and    jjn max a=a
 
 
It is proved in appendix A (c.f. (A13)) that the income elasticities are equal to: 
 
ii 1)m,x(E a-a+=                                                                                                      (10) 
 
It should be noted that since the income elasticities are not equal to one, preferences 
are non-homothetic (point i of the list).  
 
It follows from (10) that commodity i is necessary when aa i >  and luxury when aa i < . 
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The income elasticities are lower-bounded as well as upper-bounded: 
 
inii11 1)m,x(E1 a-a+££a-a+<a   
 
They are approaching their lower and upper limits according as m tends to infinity and to 
zero respectively. In view of (7) the lower bound is at most one, while the upper bound is 
at least equal to one. The lower bound is zero or negative, allowing for inferior 
commodities if: 
 
1i 1 a+³a                                                                                                                     (11) 
 
Engel curves 
 
Let im  denote the expenditure on commodity i: iii xpm =  
 
It is shown in Somermeyer and Langhout (1972) that: 
 
0xlimpmlim i0mii0m == ®®                                                                                                   (12) 
 
and 
 
¥==
¥®¥® imiim
xlimpmlim         if 1i 1 a+<a  
                               finite=   if 1i 1 a+=a                                                                     (13)  
                                0=        if 1i 1 a+>a  
 
As shown in (11) the criterion 11 a+  also rules the sign of the lower bound of the income 
elasticity. Equation (12) means that the Engel curve arises from the origin; while 
equations (13) imply the possibility of three main types of Engel curves, viz.: 
 
(1) unlimited monotonic increase if 1i 1 a+<a  
 
(2) monotonic increase to a maximum (saturation) level if 1i 1 a+=a , and 
 
(3) decrease towards zero after having reached a maximum level if 1i 1 a+>a . 
. 
For more details, as well as an application to the Netherlands, we refer to Somermeyer 
and Langhout (1972).  
 
It should be noted that types (2) and (3) cannot occur if 01 >a . In practice, however, 
this case is not likely to occur, since this implies that all budget items are of a fairly 
urgent nature. 
 
It follows from this section that three types of (non-linear) Engel curves are allowed for 
and that the demand is well-behaved across a tremendous variation in incomes (point ii 
of the list). 
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5. Price and substitution elasticities  
 
Price elasticities 
 
From (A14) in appendix A it follows that the own price elasticities read: 
 
01)w1()p,x(E iiii <-a-=                                                                                         (14) 
 
so that Giffen goods are excluded, whereas the cross price elasticities are: 
 
jjji w)p,x(E a-=                                                                                                          (15) 
 
which means that all cross elasticities of a particular price are the same. 
 
The price response implied by (15) is the following. If the price increase of jp  refers to a 
necessary commodity, i.e. ja  positive and rather close to one, then the expenditure on 
all other commodities will decrease with a given percentage jjw a- . If the price 
increase of jp  refers to a luxury commodity, i.e. ja  negative, and of considerable 
magnitude, then all other expenditures will increase with jjw a- (>0!). It follows that 
luxuries are price elastic and necessities inelastic. Thus both positive and negative cross 
price effects are distributed neutrally over all other commodities. In many circumstances 
such proportional effects do not seem to be an unreasonable price response in the 
framework of a CGE model. 
 
Admittedly, CDE and AIDADS allow for more flexibility with respect to cross price 
responses. Constancy of the cross price elasticities is the price that has to be paid for a 
parameterization of the indirect addilog system that is more parsimonious  than CDE or  
AIDADS. 
 
Elasticities of substitution 
 
Having derived the income and price elasticities, the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution, ijs , easily follow from the well-known relationship: 
 
)]m,x(E[w)p,x(E iijjji -s=  
 
 and, for the own elasticities, read: 
 
)1()1(
w
1
i
i
ii a++a--=s  
 
while for the cross-elasticities they are: 
 
)1(jiij a++a-a-=s                                                                                                (16) 
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The well-known property that the differences  of the cross-elasticities are constant easily 
follows from (16). It should be noted that Chung (1994, p.44, (3.71)) incorrectly states 
that they are equal to zero. This is caused by the fact that Chung incorrectly uses the 
indirect utility function in the definition of the Allen partial elasticity of substitution instead 
of the cost function. 
 
6. Calibration of the parameters 
 
In order to calibrate the parameters ia  we need to have outside information on the 
income elasticities and on the Frisch parameter, the elasticity of marginal utility with 
respect to total expenditure m, denoted by mf . 
 
It is derived in appendix A (c.f. (A1 7)) that for the addilog system the Frisch parameter is 
equal to: 
 
)a1(f m +-=                                                                                                                 (17) 
 
Consequently, it follows from (10) and (17) that the calibrated values of ia are: 
 
)]m,x(Ef[a imi +-=                                                                                                    (18) 
 
We assume that a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is available. We put all prices equal 
to 1, we denote the household expenditure in the SAM by 0m  and the budget shares 
by 0iw . Then, taking the identifying restriction (8) into account, we use (6) to calibrate ic : 
å
=
=
n
1j
a00
j
a00
ii
ji ]m[w/]m[wc                                                                                         (19) 
 
7. An application of the indirect addilog system: a CGE model for Palestine 
 
In this section we show a concrete Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) application of 
the addilog demand system we have previously illustrated. The application is related to 
our previous works on the Palestinian economy (Missaglia and de Boer, 2004; de Boer 
and Missaglia, 2005) and, most notably, it refers to the building of a counterfactual 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Palestinian economy in 2002. The last available 
official SAM for the Palestinian economy dates back to 1998 and the need to build a 
new, counterfactual SAM comes from the tremendous shock suffered by the Palestinian 
economy after the outbreak of the second intifada, which is likely to have dramatically 
changed its size and composition over the last years. 
 
The counterfactual SAM has been obtained by giving our CGE model for the Palestinian 
economy a major so-called “intifada-shock”. Before illustrating our results and comparing 
them with the aggregate figures estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is 
worth giving a short description of both the CGE model and the intifada-shock. 
The CGE model (for a detailed description see Missaglia and de Boer, 2004) is an 
“almost” standard, static model where, compared with a fully standard model, two 
elements are to be emphasized. First, the household (in the model there is just one 
representative consumer) consumption behavior is based on the addilog demand 
system we have described in-depth in the previous sections of the paper. Second, in the 
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model we use the unemployment theory delineated in the migration literature by Harris 
and Todaro (1970) to describe the wage gap between rural and urban jobs. The core of 
the theory is described by the following arbitrage condition (acting as a wage curve): 
 
PLF.b
UNEMPLF
LF
PL
+
=  
 
The wage rate paid by Palestinians firms to Palestinian workers, PL, must be equal, in 
equilibrium, to the expected wage rate of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel or in 
the settlements. The latter is equal to the wage rate prevailing in Israel or in the 
settlements, PLF, multiplied by the probability of getting a job over there and the       
factor b. The probability of getting a job in Israel or in the settlements is simply given by 
the ratio of the Palestinians actually employed there (LF) to the workers who look for a 
job there: those who manage (LF) and those who do not (UNEMP). The factor b may be 
interpreted as the inverse of the probability of getting a job in Palestine, so that the 
arbitrage condition states nothing but the equality between two expected wages: 
 
P (Job in Palestine).PL = P (Job in Israel or in the settlements).PLF 
 
The “intifada-shock” we gave to the 1998 benchmark to build our counterfactual 2002 
SAM is a set of several shocks (again, for a fully detailed description of the intifada-
shock see Missaglia and de Boer, 2004; and de Boer and Missaglia, 2005): a reduction 
in the capital stock, due to the physical damages provoked by the conflict; a fall in the 
level of labour income earned in Israel and the settlements, due to closures imposed by 
the Israeli authorities; an increase in donors’ disbursements; a reduction in the 
household’s propensity to save, a natural reaction during hard times; a reduction in the 
PA savings, due to the withholding of clearance revenues by Israel and the use of an 
increasing amount of money to pay for public employees’ wages; an increase in the 
labor force; finally, an increase in the parameter b, i.e. a reduction in the probability of 
getting a job in Palestine. 
From this major intifada-shock we derive a counterfactual SAM for 2002 and, by 
aggregation, we can thus derive the figures for the components of GNI. In table 1 our 
figures (DBM) are presented together with those derived by the IMF (2003) through the 
help of a purely macro, income-expenditure model. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between DBM and the IMF 
 
 1998 (million US$) 2002 (prices 1998, million 
US$) 
 DBM IMF Ratio DBM IMF Ratio 
Private Consumption 3,977 4,245 .937 3,630 3,956 .917 
Public Consumption 976 954 1.023 1,158 1,041 1.112 
Total fixed investment 1,675 1,494 1.121 998 661 1.509 
Exports 729 886 .823 470 426 1.103 
Imports 3,053 3,321 .919 2890 2,896 .997 
GDP 4,304 4,258 1.011 3366 3,188 1.055 
NFI 779 903 .863 390 465 0.838 
GNI 5,083 5,161 .985 3,756 3,653 1.028 
* The ratio is the figure DBM divided by the one of the IMF 
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The main difference between our (DBM) results and the IMF results concerns total fixed 
investment, larger in DBM, and, symmetrically, private consumption, lower in DBM. The 
sum of the two items, however, is remarkably close to each other. One possible 
explanation for this difference can be found in the role played in our model by the 
“Construction” sector. Indeed, “in the Palestinian economy more than half of total 
investment is concentrated into unproductive investment, such as residential building...” 
(Astrup and Dessus, 2002, p.18). A part of this “investment”, its annual equivalent, 
should be assimilated to consumption, something that does not add anything to the 
productive capacity of the economy. However, in the SAM we used to calibrate the 
model the output of the “Construction” sector is classified as investment, which may 
explain the origin of the observed difference. 
 
It must also be noted that, as expected, the figures (DBM) we obtain for 2002 are close 
to the figures we obtained by imposing the same intifada-shock to a previous version of 
the model where we used a Linear Expenditure System (LES) instead of an addilog 
system (see De Boer and Missaglia, 2005). But a word of caution is needed: the 
aggregate figures (those reported in Table 1) are very close, but the sectoral 
composition of consumption is different. This is not surprising. Indeed, in a LES 
framework the marginal budget shares are constant, but this kind of limitation disappears 
in an addilog framework: faced with the same negative shock, households will reduce 
more (compared with what they would do in a LES framework) the consumption of some 
goods and will reduce less the consumption of some other goods.  
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Appendix A The indirect utility function and some derivations 
 
The indirect utility function of the indirect addilog system reads: 
 
)(
n
1j
jj
j)m/p(c)m,p(v a
=
å-=                                                                                             (A1) 
where: 
j
j)(
j
1)m/p(
)m/p(
j
j
a
-
=
a
a
  for 0j ¹a                                                                            (A2) 
                   )m/plog( j=     for 0j =a  
 
(the so-called Box-Cox transformation). Since from an empirical point of view the special 
case 0i =a is not interesting, we shall disregard it in the sequel and we shall only 
consider the first line of (A2) for which it will be shown below that it gives rise to the 
budget share equations (6). 
 
Derivation of the indirect utility function with respect to m leads to: 
 
1a
j
a
jj
jj mpc
m
)m,p(v --å=¶
¶
                                                                                            (A3) 
 
which is only increasing in m for all 0p j > , when: 
 
0c j >                                                                                           for n,...,1j =              (A4)     
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Secondly, we derive from (A1) that under (A4): 
 
0mpc
p
)m,p(v
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¶
¶ a--a                                                                                          (A5) 
 
hence the indirect utility function is decreasing in prices, as it should be. 
 
From (A5) we derive: 
 
ii a2a
iii
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mpc)a1(
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v ---=
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                                                        for ji =   
             0=                                                                                   for ji ¹  
 
The indirect utility function is strictly convex, and consequently strictly quasi-convex, 
whenever: 
 
1i <a                                                                                          for n,...,1i =               (A6) 
 
Van Daal (1983) has shown that the indirect utility function of the indirect addilog model 
is strictly quasi-convex if and only if: 
 
0ci >  and  1i £a                                                                                                          (A7) 
 
where the equality sign may apply for at most one value of i. 
 
Application of Roy’s identity, i.c.: 
 
m/)m,p(v
p/)m,p(vx ii ¶¶
¶¶-=  to the first line of (A2), using (A3) and (A5), leads to: 
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which, after pre-multiplication with m/p i , gives the budget share equations (6). 
 
From (A8) we derive: 
 
)1(mx
m
x
i
1
i
i a+a-=
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where  
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and: 
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where  1`ij =d  for ji =  ,and 
                0=  for ji ¹  
 
(the so-called Kronecker delta). 
 
Consequently, using (A9) and (A11), the typical element ijs  of the Slutsky matrix: 
jiji
1
jij
i
j
i
ij s)1(mxxxm
x
p
x
s =a+a-a-=
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
= -  for ji ¹                                       (A12) 
 
Van Driel (1974) has shown that the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite with rank  
(n-1) if and only if (A7) holds true.  
 
From (A9) the income elasticities easily follow: 
 
ii 1)m,x(E a-a+=                                                                                                    (A13) 
 
whereas the price elasticities follow from (A11): 
 
ijijjji d)a1(aw)p,x(E ---=                                                                                     (A14) 
  
The Frisch parameter, the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to total expenditure m 
is defined as: 
 
m
?
.
?
m
f m ¶
¶
=                                                                                                                (A15) 
 
The relationship between the indirect utility function and the marginal utilityl (see for 
instance equation (7.10) in Varian (1992), page 108) is: 
m
)m,p(v
?
¶
¶
= , so that it follows 
from (A3) that for the indirect addilog system we obtain: 
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From (A15) and (A16) it follows that: 
 
)a1(f m +-=                                                                                                              (A17) 
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Appendix B The indirect addilog system with leisure 
 
Model and calibration 
 
We assume that the household has an exogenously given time endowment, denoted by 
TS, that it allocates over labor supply, denoted by LS, and leisure, denoted by 1nx + , i.e. 
 
1nxLSTS ++=                                                                                                               (B1) 
 
We take account of the consumption of leisure, valued at the wage rate 1np + , define the 
extended household expenditure: 
 
1n1n xpmem +++=                                                                                                          (B2) 
 
and assume that the household maximizes the extended indirect addilog utility function: 
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subject to the extended household expenditure (B2). (Note that we abstract from the 
special case that one or more ja  is equal to zero). 
 
It follows straightforwardly that the optimal shares in the extended budget are: 
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As before, we need to have outside information on the expenditure elasticities and on 
the Frisch parameter in order to calibrate the parameters ia  and ic (i running from 1 to n 
for the commodities, while i is equal to 1n +  for leisure). In this framework we need to 
have values of these elasticities (and of the Frisch parameter) with respect to the 
extended household budget, em (including leisure), but in practice they are usually 
supplied with respect to the budget, m (excluding leisure). Moreover, in practice a value 
of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the budget m is specified, rather than the 
expenditure elasticity of leisure with respect to the extended budget. 
 
First, we consider the case that i runs from 1 to n: 
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The expenditure elasticities with respect to the extended budget are equal to those with 
respect to the budget (excluding leisure) multiplied by m/em , i.e. the inverse of the 
share of the budget (excluding leisure) in the extended budget (including leisure).  
Secondly, we consider leisure ( 1nx + ). Using (B1) we derive: 
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Using (B5) and replacing 1nx +  by ( LSTS - ) according to (B1), we arrive at: 
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Finally, for the Frisch parameter with respect to the extended budget we derive: 
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From the outside information on the income elasticities, )m,x(E i for n,...,1i = , the 
elasticity of labor supply, )m,LS(E , the Frisch parameter mf , and on TS we derive (B5) 
- (B7) that are used in the same way as before for the calibration of the parameters ia  
( )1n,...,1i += . 
 
The parameters ic  are calibrated in the same way as in (19), em  replacing m , and 
1n + replacing n : 
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Equivalent and compensating variation 
 
Suppose that we have two different policy regimes: the "benchmark equilibrium", and the 
"proposed change". Under the "benchmark equilibrium" the consumer faces prices and 
(extended) expenditure ( )em,p 00 , and under the "proposed change" he faces )em,p( 11 .  
 
The equivalent variation (EV) measures the expenditure change at current prices ( 0p ) 
that would be equivalent to the proposed change in terms of its impact on utility. 
 
Let evem denote the expenditure that at current prices  ( 0p ) would yield utility 
level )em,p(V 11 . Then, the equivalent variation is defined as: 
 
0ev ememEV -=  
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It follows from the indirect utility function (B3) that vem has to be solved numerically 
from: 
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The compensating variation (CV) measures the income change that would be necessary 
to compensate the consumer for the price change, induced by the "proposed change". 
Let cvem denote the expenditure that at prices 1p  would yield the utility level 
)em,p(V 00 .Then, the compensating variation is equal to: 
 
cv1 ememCV -=  
 
where cvem  has to be solved numerically from: 
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